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In a world where electoral reforms are frequently discussed, numerous countries have resorted to 
mandating citizen participation in elections. This electoral approach – commonly termed 
compulsory voting – has been adopted by democratic and authoritarian regimes alike. The 
majority of research on compulsory voting acknowledges that it successfully increases voter 
turnout. Other factors including the presence and severity of sanctions for abstention have been 
analyzed, but the existing literature fails to consider multiple components of compulsory voting.  
This research strives to bridge that gap through the use of preliminary data, a literature review of 
existing work, and case studies of Brazil and Belgium as it seeks to address the effectiveness of 
compulsory voting today. By considering various elements of past and present systems 
simultaneously, this research finds that compulsory voting is only as effective as a country’s 
political, social and economic configurations allow. If implemented correctly, compulsory voting 
is effective in increasing voter turnout and has the potential to create more representative election 
results. 
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 Experts in the United States have long debated how to create more representative election 
results. For some, the obvious solution is to abolish the outdated Electoral College that continues 
to undermine the popular will of the people. Others have suggested changing the electoral system 
to move away from plurality voting or to end gerrymandering. Regardless of the proposed 
solution, it is clear that many Americans are unsatisfied with the electoral status quo. According 
to an NPR/Marist poll for example, approximately 2 in 5 American voters believe that elections 
in the United States are not fair (Parks, 2018). Electoral inequality is not an issue unique to the 
United States, but political rhetoric demanding election reform becomes amplified in one of the 
largest democracies in the world. For example, Maine adopted ranked-choice voting in 2016, 
becoming the first state to implement the electoral practice statewide (Maine State Legislature, 
2020). Similarly, ranked-choice voting was on the ballot in Massachusetts during the 2020 
general election. The initiative was defeated in the Bay State, but rhetoric and legislative 
proposals advocating for ranked-choice voting and other electoral reforms continue to this day. 
While ranked-choice voting has received a considerable amount of attention in this area, a lesser 
discussed idea is that of compulsory voting. 
 Compulsory voting involves a government legally requiring its citizens to register to vote 
and cast ballots on election day. While the practice of compulsory voting in the United States is 
often analyzed by political scientists in academia, it is rarely mentioned or considered by 
politicians. Yet, the United States has long endured low voter turnout rates, with a current 
average turnout rate for national elections of 53.63% (IFES Election Guide). This is notably 
lower than rates seen in other democracies – especially those with compulsory systems in place – 
but the government has done relatively little to combat this issue. In contrast, numerous other 
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democracies have turned to compulsory voting in an effort to increase voter turnout and political 
participation among their citizens. 
 Therefore, the question I explore in this paper is whether compulsory voting is an 
effective tool to reform electoral systems and to secure more representative election results. I 
hypothesize that compulsory voting is an effective way to boost voter turnout and create more 
equal results because of an increased number of ballots cast. While there is already a significant 
amount of literature on compulsory voting, the bulk of the research has so far focused on one 
specific factor, such as turnout or severity of sanctions. My research strives to fill a gap by 
considering multiple factors of compulsory voting simultaneously. Specifically, I argue that the 
efficacy of compulsory voting can only be determined when several key factors are collectively 
considered. 
 In addition to a review of the literature published on the topic in the past twenty years, 
my methodology includes a quantitative analysis of basic political data on countries that have 
adopted compulsory voting, as well as two case studies. 
The quantitative table lists relevant data for every country that currently uses (or once 
used) compulsory voting. I turned to Freedom House to assess the level of democracy in each of 
these countries. Data from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance and 
the International Foundation for Electoral Systems was included to provide a timeline of 
compulsory voting and average voter turnout rates for each country. This data collectively 
provides a global view of compulsory voting. In terms of my case studies, Brazil was chosen 
because it has the largest electorate required to vote (Power and Roberts, 1995). Belgium was 
examined because it has one of the oldest compulsory systems in existence and because of its 
consistently low abstention rates (Pilet, 2007). 
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I first review the relevant literature. Next, I provide a general overview of compulsory 
voting around the world, relying on my quantitative findings for evidence. This is followed by 
the two case studies describing the nature and circumstances of two prominent compulsory 





 Compulsory voting has been the subject of a substantial amount of political science 
research over the last two decades. This literature often starts from the idea that low turnout – 
which compulsory voting seeks to address – is a fundamental issue for many reasons. Chief 
among them is the fact that it is often synonymous with unequal turnout – defined as 
participation that is “systematically biased in favor of privileged citizens (those with better 
education, higher incomes, and greater wealth)” (Lijphart, 1998: 2). In a similar regard, Lever 
(2010: 900) found that while turnout has been on a steady decline in the majority of democracies 
since World War II, “those people who do least well in our societies are least likely to vote” and 
are consequently “least likely to attract sympathetic attention from politicians.” This research 
suggests that low voter turnout creates inequalities and explains why compulsory voting is 
perceived as an ideal remedy for this ongoing issue. 
 Thus, the logic behind compulsory voting is rather simple – legally requiring all citizens 
to vote will increase turnout. Empirical evidence reviewed by the literature suggests that 
compulsory voting does in fact increase voter participation. For example, an article in the 
Harvard Law Review (2007: 592) found that the practice increases “voter turnout by seven to 
sixteen percentage points.” Similarly, Pilet (2007) touches upon this in his research on Belgium, 
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citing turnout rates between 1981 and 2003 to show an abstention rate consistently below 10 
percent. This data only includes the twenty-year period Pilet chose to consider, but it nonetheless 
shows a reliable, consistently high turnout among Belgians. Uruguay and Australia – with 
compulsory systems dating back to 1934 and 1924 respectively – also maintain abstention rates 
below 10 percent (IFES Election Guide). 
The existing literature also demonstrates that penalties matter greatly in determining the 
success of compulsory voting. Penalties are only enforced in some of the countries with this 
electoral practice in place, but they speak volumes about the integrity of compulsory voting and 
its effects on eligible voters. For example, Singh (2011) found that penalties for abstention – and 
whether the government follows through with enforcement of these penalties – have an impact 
on turnout come election day. According to him: “while individual-level factors are critically 
important to turnout…the presence and severity of compulsory voting rules still boosts 
participation” (Singh 2011: 108). 
Although monetary fines are the most common way for governments to enforce 
compulsory voting, the literature suggests that nonmonetary penalties serve as a more effective 
deterrent for abstention (Cepaluni and Hidalgo, 2016). Correspondingly, Dassonneville et al. 
(2019) found that monetary fines do not seem to have a drastic effect, at least in some countries. 
Perhaps penalties are less needed in countries that have had compulsory voting in effect for a 
while. For example, in Belgium, fines have not been levied since 2003, but turnout rates have 
remained “stable at a high level” (2019: 213). Yet, though generally more effective, 
nonmonetary fines can also lead to undesirable results by enticing certain citizens to vote more 
than others (Cepaluni and Hidalgo, 2016). 
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 Additionally, several studies have underlined more problematic consequences of 
compulsory voting. For example, Dassonneville et al. (2019: 227) suggest that compulsory 
voting diminishes vote quality and “tends to weaken the impact of ideological proximity 
considerations on electoral behavior.” Dassonneville et al. (2019: 227) use the term ideological 
proximity considerations to refer to the political viewpoints of voters on what they refer to as the 
“left-right scale.” These considerations traditionally motivate an electorate to support certain 
candidates over others depending on their own political affiliation, but compulsory voting can 
alter the standard decision-making process through which people cast their ballots. In the same 
fashion, if reluctant voters do not cast a vote based on their individual political beliefs, “they will 
not succeed in having their priorities heard in the political decision-making process” 
(Dassonneville, 2019: 225). This research – basing its assessment on data from Australia, Brazil, 
Belgium and Switzerland – suggests that legally requiring the electorate to vote can create a 
resentment of sorts, resulting in election outcomes that are not truly representative. Increasing 
turnout is certainly beneficial, but it becomes problematic when it disengages voters. 
 Finally, compulsory voting can increase the frequency of invalid ballots, making it clear 
that forcing people to vote does not necessarily guarantee more representative election results. 
Though more votes are cast in compulsory systems, the submission of invalid ballots can 
undermine the integrity of election results. Similarly, Kouba and Mysicka (2019: 8-9) found that 
compulsory voting can “contribute to equalizing the political voice across income or education 
groups,” but that this progress is “effectively erased by the high share of…biased invalid votes.” 
Thus, it is evident that inequality can remain within a compulsory system even when a seemingly 
equal variety of voters cast ballots. 
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 The literature has provided a solid foundation for my study of the effectiveness of 
compulsory voting. It is clear that compulsory voting does in fact increase voter turnout, but this 
increase is not necessarily created without forfeiting other elements of the democratic process — 
specifically the quality of the vote and electoral outcomes. 
 I turn next to my case studies to assess these findings. The analysis explores the extent to 
which compulsory voting is effective based in part on the successes of various compulsory 
systems. 
 
A Global Perspective of Compulsory Voting 
To better understand how prevalent compulsory voting is, I compiled data using the 
following sources: Freedom House, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, and CNN Philippines (see Table 
1). The calculations that follow are approximate as I do not have all of the data; however, they 
offer interesting preliminary evidence on the prevalence and practices of compulsory voting. 
Compulsory voting is more diverse and widespread than one might think. It is not an 
experiment being conducted in one specific country but is instead a democratic tool being 
employed throughout the world. The electoral practice spans several continents and dates back to 
the mid-nineteenth century. Since its inception, compulsory voting has been used by democracies 
and authoritarian regimes alike. While one might assume that only an oppressive regime would 
force its people to participate in the electoral process, this is simply not the case. Compulsory 
voting continues to be a well-respected system in numerous democracies. With a total of 17 
countries maintaining compulsory voting laws to this day, it is clear that there remains a practical 
use for this electoral practice. 
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Of the 17 countries with compulsory voting laws currently in effect, 88 percent are 
consolidated or semi-consolidated democracies. This finding is expected as it is traditionally 
democratic systems that invite political participation via the ballot. Compulsory voting is favored 
by democracies looking to increase voter participation and ultimately voter turnout. The other 
type of government accounting for 12 percent of the countries with compulsory voting is that of 
a semi-consolidated authoritarian regime. Voter turnout is significantly higher in consolidated 
and semi-consolidated democracies, with a median voter turnout rate of 78.52%. Within semi-
consolidated authoritarian regimes, the median voter turnout rate is 50.17%. The political, social, 
and electoral structures are quite different between these systems, but compulsory voting is 
statistically more effective in consolidated and semi-consolidated democracies. 
 As discussed above, sanctions for abstention are a defining characteristic of compulsory 
systems. Many of these countries explicitly define these sanctions in their electoral code, but 
only a portion follow through in penalizing abstaining voters. Only 59 percent of countries with 
compulsory voting enforce their sanctions, while the remaining 41 percent opt out of doing so. 
Data demonstrates that countries enforcing sanctions for abstention witness higher voter turnout 
rates than those that do not. The median turnout rate for countries that enforce sanctions is 
82.27%, nearly twenty percentage points higher than the median turnout rate of 64.90% for 
countries not enforcing these penalties. This preliminary data suggests that the enforcement of 
sanctions decreases abstention rates to a significant extent. The administration of sanctions is 




Data compiled from Freedom House, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, and the 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems. 
Average turnout rate for the Philippines compiled from CNN Philippines.
 
1 Global Freedom Score (out of 100) 
2 Only in the regions of Tyrol, Vorarlberg, and Styria. 
3 Men in 1892. Both sexes in 1949. 
4 Men in 1947. Both sexes in 1968. 
5 Formally abandoned in 2014. 
6 Only for the Senate 
7 Attempted under martial law. 
8 Only in Schaffhausen 
Country Introduced Abolished Sanctions Enforced Government GFS




Argentina 1912 -- Yes Consolidated Democracy 85 Free 70.42 
Australia 1924 -- Yes Consolidated Democracy 97 Free 92.22 
Austria2 1929 1992; 2004 Yes Consolidated Democracy 93 Free 72.45 
Belgium3 1892;1949 -- Yes Consolidated Democracy 96 Free 90.16 
Bolivia 1952 -- Yes Semi-Consolidated Democracy 63 Partly Free 82.26 
Brazil 1932 -- Yes Consolidated Democracy 75 Free 79.54 
Bulgaria 2016 -- No Consolidated Democracy 80 Free 49.25 
Chile 1925 2012 Yes Consolidated Democracy 90 Free 68.32 
Costa Rica 1959 -- No Consolidated Democracy 91 Free 64.90 
Cyprus 1960 2017 Yes Consolidated Democracy 94 Free 84.44 
Dominican 
Republic N/A 2010 No Semi-Consolidated Democracy 67 Partly Free 60.85 
Ecuador4 1947; 1968 -- Yes Semi-Consolidated Democracy 65 Partly Free 72.98 
Egypt 1956 -- No Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regime 21 Not Free 33.41 
Fiji5 1992 2006 Yes Semi-Consolidated Democracy 60 Partly Free 82.84 
France6 1950s/1960s -- No Consolidated Democracy 90 Free 70.46 
Greece 1926 -- No Consolidated Democracy 88 Free 78.52 
Italy 1945 1993 No Consolidated Democracy 89 Free 60.64 
Mexico 1857 -- No Semi-Consolidated Democracy 62 Partly Free 59.22 
Nauru 1965 -- Yes Consolidated Democracy 77 Free 89.52 
Peru 1933  Yes Consolidated Democracy 72 Free 82.27 
Philippines7 1972 1986 No Semi-Consolidated Democracy 59 Partly Free 78.00 
Spain 1907 1923 No Consolidated Democracy 92 Free 69.98 
Switzerland8 1904 -- Yes Consolidated Democracy 96 Free 46.58 
Thailand 1997 -- No Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regime 32 Partly Free 66.92 
Uruguay 1934 -- Yes Consolidated Democracy 98 Free 90.20 
Venezuela 1958 1993 No Consolidated Authoritarian Regime 16 Not Free 61.65 
 9 
Two Case Studies of Compulsory Voting 
 
Case Study – Brazil 
Democratic government is a relatively new reality in Brazil. It was not until 1979 that 
Brazilian military forces began a measured transition to democracy in light of an economic crisis 
marked by rising interest rates and soaring debt (Pio, 2013) – though full democracy was not 
restored until 1988. Following the 1964 coup d'état, an authoritarian military regime gained 
power and took swift action to undermine civil liberties, including the abolition of the multiparty 
system (Power and Roberts, 1995). This shift in power marked the beginning of substantial 
change in Brazil. Power and Roberts (1995) assert that although elections continued to take place 
under authoritarian control, they were enshrouded by political purges, government intimidation, 
and violence. It was during this time that a substantial number of voters started to cast blank or 
spoiled ballots in protest against the oppressive regime. Hope returned once the multiparty 
system was reinstated and an indirect presidential election ushered in the transition to democratic 
rule (Power and Roberts, 1995). The complex and uncertain nature of elections prior to the return 
of democratic rule altered how many citizens perceived voting. Even with compulsory voting in 
place, some cast ballots in protest while others simply did not bother voting at all. This sentiment 
remains in Brazil to an extent even under democratic governance. 
The composition of the Brazilian electorate has drastically changed over the last 80 years. 
According to Power and Roberts (1995), through advances in education levels, a rapid increase 
in population growth, the effects of urbanization, and the removal of voting barriers, tens of 
millions of Brazilians have been invited to participate in the democratic process. During the 1945 
elections, there were approximately 7.5 million people who were eligible to vote. Only 50 years 
later this number had grown exponentially to an electorate of 95 million Brazilians (Power and 
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Roberts, 1995). In their analysis, Power and Roberts (1995) further explain how suffrage was 
extended even further in 1985, when illiterate citizens were enfranchised by the Brazilian 
government, which increased the overall size of the electorate by 30 percent.  
The enfranchisement of illiterate citizens was significant because the majority of the 
country had lacked proper education, with less than a quarter of the population having received 
an education through the fourth grade (Power and Roberts, 1995). Though voting was entirely 
voluntary for illiterate Brazilians, extending suffrage made the electoral process far more 
inclusive and welcoming. Power and Roberts (1995) show that the ratification of the democratic 
constitution in 1988 is the most recent example of enfranchisement, as it lowered the voting age 
to 16 and extended suffrage to another 2 million citizens. Voting remains voluntary for illiterate 
citizens, individuals 16 or 17 years of age, and those over the age of 70 (International IDEA). 
These achievements taking place over the course of eight decades allowed the Brazilian 
electorate to become more diverse and representative of the population as a whole. This 
expanded suffrage has shaped the current electorate and influenced the electoral processes 
known today. 
Today, Brazil is a pluralist democracy that holds competitive elections with 
approximately 35 political parties vying for seats in the national legislature (Freedom House). In 
the 2018 Election for the Chamber of Deputies, 30 parties – including the Workers’ Party, Social 
Liberal Party, and the Progressive Party – won seats through an open-list proportional 
representation system to serve a four-year term (IFES Election Guide). Freedom House classifies 
Brazil as free, though democracy continues to be undermined by corruption at the highest levels 
of government and violence levied against journalists and activists alike. 
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It is important to consider the nature of Brazil’s electoral system in assessing compulsory 
voting and its effects on factors including voter participation rates and election results. Brazil has 
an electoral system that is considered unusual when compared to other democracies throughout 
the world. The system contains elements of majoritarian and proportional representation. 
Elections determining positions in the upper house of the national legislature – the Federal 
Senate – are conducted by a plurality system, similar to that in the United States (Power and 
Roberts, 1995). Since 1978, as Power and Roberts (1995) explain, the citizens in each Brazilian 
state elect three senators. Elections for the lower house – the Chamber of Deputies – vary from 
that of the upper house and employ a system known as open-list proportional representation, 
allowing voters to rank-order their candidates with the political parties having no say in the 
decision (Power and Roberts, 1995). Electing members of the lower house in this fashion 
diminishes the influence of political parties and allows campaigns to focus on individual 
candidates rather than the ideology of a specific party (Power and Roberts, 1995). 
Brazil is the largest country in the world to mandate compulsory voting for its citizens. 
Compulsory voting has been a part of the Electoral Code of Brazil since 1932 (International 
IDEA). According to Cepaluni and Hidalgo (2016), all literate citizens between the ages of 
eighteen and sixty-nine are required to register to vote and to cast a ballot — while voting 
remains optional for the relatively small number of illiterate citizens and the elderly. Only a 
portion of the electorate is obliged to vote and this certainly impacts the extent to which election 
results represent the will of the Brazilian people. Cepaluni and Hidalgo (2016) further assert that 
the only two exemptions to compulsory voting are illness and travel, provided the exemptions 
are formally requested from the appropriate governmental body. Barring these two 
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circumstances, citizens who qualify for compulsory voting are expected to register and vote in 
elections. 
 Penalties levied against abstaining voters provide necessary insight into the effectiveness 
of compulsory voting within a country and Brazil exemplifies this well. The monetary penalties 
for abstention in Brazil are quite clear – abstaining voters who fail to secure a formal exemption 
are required to pay a fee of three to ten percent of the regional hourly minimum wage at their 
local electoral judiciary office (Cepaluni and Hidalgo, 2016). As explained by Cepaluni and 
Hidalgo (2016), the minimum wage in Brazil is equal to approximately $1.60 USD per hour, so 
the fee itself – which amounts to less than 0.4% of the average worker’s monthly income – is not 
substantially burdensome on the majority of the population. That being said, failure to pay the 
fee can further complicate the lives of Brazilian citizens. Those who do not pay the abstention 
fee are unable to obtain a passport, participate in civil service exams, hold a government job, 
enroll in a public university, or even receive loans from state banks (Cepaluni and Hidalgo, 
2016). These subsequent consequences are certainly more restrictive than a small fine amounting 
to no more than an hour of minimum wage. It is understandable why nonmonetary penalties act 
as more of a deterrent than a fine having little impact on the average Brazilian’s income.  
 Though the penalties are uniform for the entire population, they do not impact citizens 
equally. As research by Cepaluni and Hidalgo (2016) demonstrates, the nonmonetary penalties 
for abstention primarily impact the middle and upper classes who make use of state services. 
This suggests that the decision to abstain from voting would impact the middle and upper classes 
far more than it would poorer Brazilians, and thereby only creates an incentive to vote for a 
portion of the electorate. Their research also indicates that the number of state services used is 
dependent upon the education level of citizens; the more educated a Brazilian citizen, the more 
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likely they are to use state services (Cepaluni and Hidalgo, 2016). It follows that the current 
electoral rules in place – which incentivize the middle and upper classes much more than poor 
and working-class citizens – indirectly undermine the integrity of election results. Compulsory 
voting cannot improve democracy within a state when only certain voices are being heard. 
Finally, Brazil is still witnessing the casting of blank and spoiled ballots three decades 
after returning to democratic rule. According to Leslie Bethell (2018), within recent elections, 
between 10 and 20 percent of votes cast were either blank or voluntarily spoiled ballots. Despite 
the end of military rule and a decreasing amount of political involvement by the military, this 
practice continues among a substantial portion of the Brazilian electorate. In a 2014 election for 
the Chamber of Deputies, for example, approximately 15 percent of the electorate cast a blank or 
spoiled ballot, creating a combined total of 17.5 million invalid ballots (Bethell, 2018). Though 
eligible citizens are legally mandated to cast their ballots, it is clear that a significant portion of 
the electorate – for one reason or another – does not cast votes considered valid by the Brazilian 
government. This calls into question the effect of compulsory voting on the integrity of Brazilian 
elections. 
 As of the 2018 Presidential Election, Brazil had over 147 million registered voters. Of 
this population of eligible voters, 73% cast ballots in the first round of voting with a slightly 
smaller 71% participating in the second round (IFES Election Guide). This data demonstrates 
that roughly 40 million people abstained from voting in an election that would determine the 
head of government. According to DeSilver (2020), this turnout rate is actually quite high when 
compared to other democracies and falls just slightly behind the countries with the highest rates. 
Despite these impressive turnout rates, there remains a portion of the Brazilian electorate 
disillusioned by the country’s current state of democracy. A poll conducted by Datafolha in June 
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of 2020 found that 75 percent of Brazilians support democracy, while 10 percent favor 
dictatorship (Reuters Staff, 2020). This poll is relevant and shows that although there is some 
political dissatisfaction, the vast majority of the electorate supports the democratic system in 
place — a reality that undoubtedly impacts electoral perception and outcomes. 
Data demonstrates that many Brazilians continue to be critical of democracy. That being 
said, Brazilian democracy has garnered more support under the leadership of President Jair 
Bolsonaro and in light of his autocratic efforts (Reuters Staff, 2020). Within recent elections, 
more than a quarter of the Brazilian electorate has chosen not to participate in the democratic 
process. This is a substantial number of Brazilian voters who are not having their views influence 
elections. Whether or not they want to vote, their abstention impacts election outcomes. Brazil 
continues to call into question the effectiveness of compulsory voting and it shows that 
implementing compulsory voting is not an easy endeavor. 
 
Case Study – Belgium 
 
 Belgium is another democracy in which compulsory voting is in effect and this has been 
the case for more than a century. Compulsory voting was officially implemented in Belgium in 
1893 alongside the country enfranchising all men over the age of 21 (Pilet, 2007). Belgium is a 
federal parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy, with the latest constitution 
adopted in 1970 (Global EDGE). There are documented legal consequences for abstaining 
voters, but they are infrequently and irregularly enforced. According to Pilet (2007), it is evident 
that the Belgian government is quite selective in its execution of abstention penalties and rarely 
enforces the most restrictive ones. Irregular enforcement of sanctions is not uncommon in 
countries with compulsory voting laws in effect. 
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The Belgian monarchy itself is primarily ceremonial, as Freedom House explains, but the 
king does appoint the prime minister for approval by the legislature. The parliament in Belgium 
is comprised of two houses – the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives. Members of the 
Chamber are directly elected by proportional representation while Senate members are chosen by 
community and regional parliaments (Freedom House). Belgian citizens also elect 21 members 
of the European Parliament through a direct election every five years (European Union, 2020). 
Combined with local elections, Belgians have the ability to vote on several levels. As one of the 
oldest countries requiring its citizens to vote, Belgium is the focus of much research on 
compulsory voting. 
Prior to the introduction of mandatory voting, the eligibility of voters was determined by 
a variety of factors including, but not limited to, the amount of taxes paid and one’s performance 
on a formal electoral exam (Pilet, 2007). It is clear that these strict eligibility requirements only 
permitted a portion of Belgians to participate in the democratic process, a process that would 
look far different beginning in 1893. Jean-Benoit Pilet (2007) explains that it was at this time 
that the Belgian electorate grew from 136,755 to approximately 1,370,687. As was the case in 
Brazil, the enactment of compulsory voting in Belgium was accompanied by significant voter 
enfranchisement. 
Compulsory voting was not met with wide approval when it was first enacted in Belgium. 
Many citizens opposed compulsory voting and the extension of suffrage, but factors such as the 
desire to reduce abstention overpowered this opposition. During the second half of the 19th 
century, an average of only 30 to 40 percent of all eligible voters cast ballots on election day 
(Pilet, 2007). Belgium’s well-known abstention issue – as Pilet (2007) asserts – led many to 
believe that compulsory voting was the most efficient solution to the lack of political 
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participation. Beyond abstention concerns, the fear of the rise of radical parties – supported and 
enabled by voters often violently opposed to compulsory voting – served as motivation for many 
Belgians to support the concept of compulsory voting. This concern was vocalized by 
conservatives who feared that radical voters would turn out in higher numbers than moderate 
voters without an obligatory vote (Pilet, 2007). It is apparent that support for compulsory voting 
gradually increased over time and was motivated in part by concern for the future of political 
participation in the country. The manner in which the Belgian government approaches its 
electoral process makes it relatively simple for citizens to participate in their shared democracy. 
Its inclusive nature likely motivates more individuals to show up on election day. 
The voting process in Belgium is rather straightforward. Every Belgian citizen age 18 or 
older is automatically registered to vote. Exactly fifteen days prior to the election, polling cards 
are disseminated to all registered voters explicitly stating that “voting is compulsory” (Pilet, 
2007). This action, though seemingly small, demonstrates Belgium’s legitimate commitment to 
engaging voters and ultimately increasing voter participation. Since 1999, all European Union 
citizens residing in Belgium have retained the right to register and vote in local elections. 
However, voting is only compulsory for this demographic once they have registered to vote 
(Pilet, 2007). Belgium approaches voting rather uniquely compared to other countries with 
compulsory voting laws in effect. 
As discussed above, consequences for abstention vary greatly depending on the 
individual country. Belgium’s response to abstention begins by sending letters to all citizens who 
failed to vote, asking them to provide a formal explanation for their nonparticipation. Belgian 
citizens are subjected to monetary fines if the offered justification is found invalid by the 
government. Fines for the first offense range from 25€ to 50€ while the second offense can cost 
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individuals anywhere from 50€ to 125€ (Pilet, 2007). The monetary penalties levied by the 
Belgian government are notably more costly than those of the Brazilian government and in part 
explain why Belgium continues to witness high voter turnout, with an average participation rate 
of 90.16% (IFES Election Guide). It is likely more convenient for Belgians to cast their ballots 
on election day than to go through the process of explaining their abstention and potentially 
paying a hefty fine. 
While some countries may allow their citizens to pay a fine for abstention and maintain 
full voting eligibility, Belgium essentially has a four-strike system that could result in the 
temporary loss of suffrage. If a registered voter abstains from voting four times within a 15-year 
period, that individual – regardless of whether abstention fines were paid – can be stripped of 
their eligibility for the following 10 years (Pilet, 2007). This penalty is far stricter than some 
present in other countries where voters can repeatedly abstain provided that they pay the 
respective fine. The understanding that habitual abstention could result in one losing their ability 
to participate in the democratic process certainly incentivizes Belgians to participate on election 
day. Abstention also prevents individuals from applying for civil service positions, but as Pilet 
(2007) explains, these legal consequences are not consistently enforced, making compulsory 
voting more of a moral than legal obligation. The consistently high voter turnout rate in Belgium 
suggests that their version of compulsory voting is effective. Whether it be a moral commitment 
to their country or a fear of losing suffrage, it is clear that the majority of Belgian citizens are 
motivated to fulfill their civic duty. 
Belgium has witnessed consistently high voter turnout rates over the course of the last 
seven decades. The highest documented voter turnout rate is associated with the 1977 
parliamentary elections in which 95.1 percent of the electorate voted (Bittiger et al., 2004). Voter 
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participation has slightly fluctuated throughout this period of time, but it has never decreased in a 
substantial manner. In the latest parliamentary elections taking place in 2019, for example, 
approximately 88.38% of eligible voters took part in the democratic process (International 
IDEA). Data collected by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(International IDEA) also shows the number of invalid votes cast in Belgium is regularly very 
low. These figures demonstrate that compulsory voting has been extremely effective in 
increasing the amount of voter participation in Belgium. Invalid voting is not a major issue in 
Belgian democracy as it is in Brazil, and this is reflective of the generally positive sentiment that 
surrounds voting in Belgium. Belgium serves as a strong example of how compulsory voting can 





 My two case studies suggest that the overall efficacy of compulsory voting depends on 
the way it is implemented. Even though the vast majority of existing compulsory systems are 
consolidated democracies, no two democracies are exactly alike. Each state has its own social 
and economic factors, a unique political history, and varying levels of political engagement. 
These factors collectively impact how the electorate perceives the voting process, the extent to 
which voters participate on election day, and even the number of valid votes cast. Compulsory 
voting does increase voter turnout but – as data from the International Foundation for Electoral 
Systems confirms – turnout rates vary significantly even among consolidated democracies.  
Brazil and Belgium exemplify how compulsory voting can have a varying impact on an 
electorate and their participation in the democratic process. Though both countries are 
consolidated democracies, they tell two different tales of compulsory voting. This is largely 
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because of the political and social factors at play in both countries. Brazil witnesses an average 
turnout of 79.54%, which is remarkable compared to many democracies, but still below countries 
like Belgium and Australia. While it is difficult to pinpoint the exact reasons for Brazil’s 
abstention rate, it is clear that factors including its political history, sanction enforcement, and 
eligibility requirements influence this number. As mentioned above, Brazil’s sanctions primarily 
impact and incentivize the middle and upper classes. This portion of the electorate has reason to 
vote, but poor and working-class Brazilians have little motivation to cast ballots of their own. 
Brazil has indirectly created an electoral system that disproportionately represents the views of 
its wealthier citizens. On the other hand, voting remains optional for a large portion of the 
population; these individuals face minor consequences about whether or not they vote, so there is 
little motivation to do so. Brazil’s complicated political history marked in part by a military 
regime cannot be ignored either. The abuses of power that took place prior to Brazil’s return to 
democracy certainly created a negative perception of the government and the electoral process 
that remains to this day. It is possible that a portion of spoiled ballots cast within each election 
may be due to voter error or ignorance, but the casting of blank ballots is undoubtedly a form of 
protest. Although Brazil maintains adequate voter turnout rates, it is clear that if implemented 
incorrectly, compulsory voting might increase electoral inequality. 
 Belgium’s approach to compulsory voting is clearly effective as it pertains to mobilizing 
the electorate and achieving remarkably low abstention rates. Part of this success is due to the 
manner in which the Belgian government interacts with and regards its electorate. The 
dissemination of polling cards prior to election day not only reminds the electorate of their 
obligation to vote, but also indirectly unifies the electorate and creates a moral duty to vote. This 
approach is somewhat more inclusive than that in Brazil, which in part explains why Belgium 
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repeatedly sees a staggeringly low abstention rate. Belgium’s turnout rate is especially 
interesting when considering that the government rarely enforces its sanctions. Belgians possess 
a more noticeable desire to vote than Brazilians, which is reflected in their average turnout rate 
of 90.16%. Belgium has been democratic for much longer than Brazil and is more developed 
both economically and socially — two factors that can partially explain the success of 
compulsory voting there. If a government were to look for an example of how to successfully 
implement and maintain compulsory voting, Belgium would be the model to follow. 
 
Conclusion 
 Unlike previous literature on compulsory voting, this work has thoroughly analyzed the 
electoral practice through several elements at once. Instead of solely focusing on turnout rates or 
penalties, I have examined numerous factors in my assessment of the efficacy of compulsory 
voting. Due to the social, political, and economic differences of countries with compulsory 
systems, it is paramount that research takes a multifaceted approach. The electoral practice as a 
whole should not be judged based on one single factor and that is what distinguishes my work 
from existing studies on this topic. 
Compulsory voting is an effective way to increase voter turnout. If implemented 
correctly, it has the potential to create more representative election results. That being said, it is 
only as effective as a country’s political, social, and economic factors allow. If implemented in a 
manner that only amplifies the voice of part of the electorate, compulsory voting could increase 
inequality. Compulsory voting is not a perfect electoral system, but no system exists without 
flaws. It consistently increases voter turnout which is a crucial element of creating more 
representative and fair elections. Given the documented successes of compulsory systems 
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abroad, democratic countries with unwaveringly high abstention rates – including the United 
States – would be wise to consider implementing compulsory voting laws to increase turnout and 
overall representation. Compulsory voting is not strongly considered in the United States 
because electoral reform is a slow and complicated process. There is also the issue of other 
electoral reforms having priority over others and perhaps a reluctance of American voters to be 
forced to vote. Nonetheless, compulsory voting is a sensible solution to low voter turnout that 
has long plagued the United States electoral system. If the United States Congress were to work 
together to pursue and implement compulsory voting, Americans would reap the benefits of 
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